It is well recognised that public policies -such as building of roads, imposition of taxes and tariffs, or provision of defence -generally disturb the equilibrium prices of both goods and factors. Virtually all works on benefit-cost analysis would recommend that the distributional consequences of these price changes be taken into account in policy evaluation, provided that the distribution of income is deemed relevant for policy. It is, of course, theoretically possible, and even likely, that a series of complex interactions through a system of markets might be such that any given project or policy, no matter how small, would ultimately affect virtually every household in an economy to some small degree. But a practical-minded economist might anticipate that these effects, if not literally zero, are often 'negligible', and that the evaluation of the most important 'pecuniary externalities' associated with a project need not be hopelessly complex. Behind such an argument is intuition like the following: a given policy will have a major impact on certain prices, the distributional consequences of which are of first-order importance for benefit-cost analysis. But a policy which directly affects only one region or sector of an economy will generally result in rather small price changes in other sectors or regions, and these can safely be ignored. This view is exemplified by Squire and van der Tak [ 8oi ]
This intuition certainly seems most reasonable, and it is probably tacitly accepted rather widely. ' However, it overlooks the fact that while many of the price changes resulting from some project may be rather small, they may be spread over large numbers of households. It does not therefore necessarily follow that the aggregate effect is small. That is, the sum of very many very small numbers need not be negligible.
The purpose of this paper is to show that one cannot, in general, justify the practice of assuming indirect price effects to be negligible -that in fact, the real income effects arising from project-induced equilibrium price changes are typically of first-order importance, even for small projects.
The paper is organised as follows. First, Section I presents a simple model in which a very small project may result in a very small (of the order of io-6) change in equilibrium wages. It is then shown that the distributional impact of the project is nevertheless far from negligible in the sense that the evaluation of the project may be quite substantially affected by distributional considerations (e.g. showing distributional benefits on the order of I O % of project outlays). Section II discusses how one might practicably take into account such minute effects on equilibrium prices, and relates the analysis of small projects to the overall framework of project evaluation for an entire economy. Section III provides a brief conclusion. 2 The choice of bricklayers for illustration is inspired by Brown (I924), to whose arguments the essential insights of this paper can be traced. Brown (I 924, pp. 147-53) analyses the incidence of a tax on bricklayers. Bricklayers may constitute a very small part of the labour market, and as labour is reallocated so as to equalise net wage rates between bricklaying and other occupations, the gross wage of bricklayers may rise substantially while the wage of other workers may fall only slightly. Brown argues, however, that on balance the wages of workers in general will fall by the amount of the tax, that is, the small reduction in net wagcs for workers as a whole will be equal to the total tax collected. Despite its appearance over half a century ago, Brown's argument does not seem to be widely known. It has recentlv been-formalised and verified bv Thus, if bricklaying is a very small part of the labour market (o-f very small), or if the project's demand for bricklayers is very small (dno/no small), the effect of the project on equilibrium wages will be very small as well. The case that we have just analysed would appear to be one in which induced wage changes might reasonably be ignored, according to the view of benefit cost analysis cited in the introduction. Suppose, for example, that the project in question will increase the demand for bricklayers by dno/no = o-OOi, that is, o I % of the initial pool of bricklayers will be employed on the project. Suppose that bricklayers constitute I /4A0 of the workforce: 0 = o00025. If the elasticity of demand for labour (c*) is, say, I, we find that the project will increase the equilibrium wage by 2-5 x Io-6, surely a virtually imperceptible change, and one that benefit-cost analysts would like to ignore. Consider, however, the effect of the project on the total income of all workers. Since labour is inelastically supplied, any increase in the total income of workers constitutes an increase in reaJ income. We find, using (4), d(wn) = ndw = dno. Then the hiring of bricklayers for $I oo,ooo produces an indirect benefit on this account of $20,000. This is also a very small amount compared to the entire economy. But suppose that the wages of bricklayers constitute 5000 of the project's cost. Then the pro-worker redistribution entailed by the project raises its benefits, or lowers its costs, by an amount equal to IO % of the total project costs. From the viewpoint of this small project, its redistributive impact is not small. And this is the relevant viewpoint for the benefit-cost analyst. Much of this argument has been couched in terms of a particular example, and different numerical results would emerge if one were to make different numerical assumptions. The general conclusion is obviously not sensitive to the numbers selected, however.
I. TIIE NON-NEGLIGIBLE

II. PRACTICAL APPLICATION IN A SIMPLE CASE
It is really too much to expect benefit-cost analysts to predict changes in equilibrium prices from small projects, which might be on the order of io-6, say. On the other hand, we have just seen that ignoring such effects could result in significant errors in the evaluation of a small project. Of course, the total social loss from this error would be small. But now suppose that this project is just one of many similarly small projects that are collectively not small. In fact, imagine the problem of the director of an agency (e.g. the Little-Mirrlees 'COPE') charged with the evaluation of all of the projects in a given economy. To manage this process efficiently, the director assigns teams to work on the evaluation of individual projects. One possible approach would be to ask the analysts to predict and weight accordingly the distributional effects of the price changes induced by their individual small projects. If they could do this accurately, distributional effects would be properly accommodated in the evaluation of each individual project, and the director could simply choose that combination of projects yielding the greatest net social benefit. This method would fail in practice, however, because it would be impossible to predict the tiny price changes resulting from small projects. The distributional benefits and costs of all projects would then be ignored. The total social loss from these errors would be large.
An alternative approach is possible, however. To illustrate it, let us continue the example of Section I. Suppose, as before, that a $i.oo increase in real income for workers generates a $I.20 'increase in social benefits, or, more generally, a social gain of I +? where 8 * o. The director of the project evaluation agency could require the project evaluation teams to add ,/(w/c*) (Z' odni) to the benefit calculation for a project that employs dni workers of type i. Recalling (5), which applies to the special case where dni = = I, ...,k, it is clear that (w/c*) (Z' 0 dni) is the change in total wage income that results from a project employing Z' _ dni workers in total. Provided that the agency director's central research group could estimate c*, the demand elasticity for labour in the economy as a whole, it would be a simple matter for the low-level project evaluation teams to take distributional impacts into
